Chapter 6 - The Context of 5G Competition - U.S.-China Relationship

Chapter 6: The Context of 5G Competition: U.S.-China Relationship

Chapter 6: The Context of 5G Competition: U.S.-China Relationship

For this research and subsequent analysis, it is important to put into perspective the rivalry between the United States and China. This chapter will discuss where this rivalry began as well as its current state. The first section of this chapter will focus on the beginning of the current Chinese regime starting in 1949, and the beginning of the relationship between the United States and China. Then, the second section will discuss the current state of the United States and Chinese relations in relation to their pursuit of future world dominance.

I. U.S.-China Relationship in Historical Perspective

For twenty years (1949-1969), the United States tried to disrupt, destabilize, and weaken China’s communist government. Washington believed that China was an aggressive, expansionist power that threatened the security of its noncommunist neighbors. The United States constructed an off-shore line of military alliances along China’s eastern and southern borders. These included the U.S. alliances with Japan, South Korea, and the Nationalist government on Taiwan. The United States maintained military bases and, in some cases, stationed significant numbers of troops in many of these countries, especially Japan and South Korea. During these years, the United States also became involved in the war in Vietnam.¹¹⁴

¹¹⁴ Columbia University. “U.S.-China Relations Since 1949: Asia for Educators: Columbia University.” U.S.-China Relations Since 1949 | Asia for Educators | Columbia University, Columbia University, 2021, afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1950_us_china.htm.

Washington encouraged its allies to refrain entering into diplomatic relations with Beijing. The United States prohibited Americans from visiting China. The United States cut off trade and orchestrated an international embargo of Chinese goods. ¹¹⁵ By being even tougher on China than on its main communist rival, the Soviet Union, the United States pursued a so-called “wedge strategy.” This strategy aimed to encourage a split between the two communist allies. It was successful, because such a split did occur, becoming evident in around 1960 and worsening thereafter.¹¹⁶

The strategic adjustments that US and China made with President Nixon’s visit to China in 1972 eventually resulted in the establishment of diplomatic relationship between US and China in 1979 and the start of China’s economic reform in 1979 that led to China’s rise today need to be briefly described here.

After the Cold War, the United States started becoming more open to China and having relations with China. In October of 2000, President Clinton signs the U.S. – China Relations Act “granting Beijing permanent normal trade relations with the United States and paving the way for China to join the World Trade Organization in 2001. Between 1980 and 2004, U.S.-China trade rises from $5 billion to $231 billion. In 2006, China surpasses Mexico as the United States’ second-biggest trade partner, after Canada.” ¹¹⁷

¹¹⁵Columbia University. “U.S.-China Relations Since 1949: Asia for Educators: Columbia University.” U.S.-China Relations Since 1949 | Asia for Educators | Columbia University, Columbia University, 2021, afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1950_us_china.htm.

¹¹⁶ Columbia University. “U.S.-China Relations Since 1949: Asia for Educators: Columbia University.” *U.S.-China Relations Since 1949 | Asia for Educators | Columbia University, Columbia University, *2021, afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1950_us_china.htm.

¹¹⁷ Council On Foreign Relations. Timeline: U.S. relations with CHINA 1949–2021, https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-relations-china

While the current relations with China are not as much focused on military dominance or a military presence in the region, the current U.S.-Chinese relations are still very rocky today as the administrations in each country disagree on many things. Currently, the United States still has a tariff on the $370 billion of Chinese goods; this has not changed under the current Biden administration. These tariffs have not only hurt the Chinese economy, but also the economy of the United States. These tariffs seem to be a ploy to give the United States economic leverage over the Chinese.¹¹⁸

Another factor in the U.S.- China competition is the deterioration of Hong Kong’s freedoms in 2020; a move which damaged China’s relations with not just the United States, but most of the West. With the U.S. in particular, Beijing’s move to tighten restrictions around Hong Kong has led to a worsening of U.S.-China relations. “In fact, the Trump administration has sanctioned Chinese and Hong Kong officials and ordered an end to Hong Kong’s special trade status. Beijing nevertheless felt compelled to act because of the embarrassing instability created by millions of democratic protesters in its prize special administrative region.”¹¹⁹

Another factor in the U.S.-China competition is the perception of China as the culprit of the pandemic and disruptions to global supply chains which have led some U.S. politicians to demand a decoupling from China. Conspiracy theories about the origins of the outbreak, which were encouraged by disinformation and misinformation efforts from both sides, exacerbated mistrust between the two nations.

¹¹⁸ Economy, Elizabeth, et al. “How 2020 Shaped U.S.-China Relations.” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, www.cfr.org/article/how-2020-shaped-us-china-relations.

¹¹⁹ Economy, Elizabeth, et al. “How 2020 Shaped U.S.-China Relations.” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, www.cfr.org/article/how-2020-shaped-us-china-relations.

At the same time, the pandemic has led to a significant increase in the proportion of American people with a negative view of China: an October Pew Research Center survey found that 73 percent of Americans view China negatively, the highest level since 2005.¹²⁰ In China, the government’s ability to rapidly contain the virus’s spread, in conjunction with the U.S.-China diplomatic row, has solidified nationalism and antiAmericanism. “Trump’s deliberate usage of the phrase “China virus” struck a raw nerve and elicited a nationalist backlash, leading to the expulsion of American journalists in China. Also, Chinese state media outlets have portrayed the United States as a diminishing and hostile power throughout the past few months. Washington’s perceived failure in global health leadership and bullying of Beijing have convinced even liberalminded elites in China that the country should move to reduce the risks associated with interdependence with the United States.” This has led to Chinese public’s views toward the United States being significantly more negative than they were a year earlier just as the United States public views of China are significantly more negative.

By instituting this mistrust in each other, both through policies and everyday media, the U.S. and China have further emphasized their need to be the global superpower, and this dominance, as previously explained and continually discussed through this paper, will be based on which country can implement the first fully functioning, effective 5G infrastructure and technology.

II. Competition in Technology and Security Concerns against Huawei

¹²⁰ Economy, Elizabeth, et al. “How 2020 Shaped U.S.-China Relations.” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, www.cfr.org/article/how-2020-shaped-us-china-relations.

¹²¹ Economy, Elizabeth, et al. “How 2020 Shaped U.S.-China Relations.” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, www.cfr.org/article/how-2020-shaped-us-china-relations.

The current state of relations between the United States and China revolves around the competition that the United States and China have to position themselves in a way that ensures technological dominance. Each country is attempting to lessen the impact that the other country will have on its markets and global presence by cutting the other out of certain sectors, instituting tariffs, and threatening more substantial actions.

Beijing is trying to insulate itself from Washington’s pressure against them. In recent months, it announced a strategy to maintain economic growth and reduce its reliance on foreign markets and technology.¹²²² The domestic chip industry is an especially important area of focus, with the government spending billions of dollars to support research and development, encouraging small firms to enter the sector and exploring open-source technologies that could be beyond the reach of American export control laws. In addition, the Chinese leadership is asserting more political control over the technology sector: it issued new guidelines to increase the influence of the CCP within firms; blocked the IPO of Ant Group, one of the world’s highest valued financial technology companies; and unveiled new anti-monopoly regulations that limit the influence of the biggest companies.¹²³

This year saw significant escalation in the technology competition between the United States and China. “In May, the U.S. Commerce Department tightened the noose on Huawei, cutting the telecommunications manufacturer off from critical semiconductor

¹²² Economy, Elizabeth, et al. “How 2020 Shaped U.S.-China Relations.” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, www.cfr.org/article/how-2020-shaped-us-china-relations.

¹²³ Economy, Elizabeth, et al. “How 2020 Shaped U.S.-China Relations.” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, www.cfr.org/article/how-2020-shaped-us-china-relations.

suppliers and expanding restrictions on U.S. technology.” ¹²⁴ These measures handed a severe blow to the company’s 5G business, and, as a result, several European countries announced restrictions on Huawei’s participation in their telecommunication networks. In addition, the Trump administration moved to ban the Chinese-owned apps TikTok and WeChat for national security reasons, which would mark the first time the United States widely blocks foreign information technology. While these restrictions have so far been halted by the courts, the Trump administration announced its intention to limit Chinese telecom carriers and cloud service providers as well as restrict Chinese developers’ access to American mobile application stores.

Within the race for 5G dominance, countries are starting to evaluate the potential improvements that this new technology with offer such as faster download speeds, connected devices, and improved, more efficient businesses and companies. While looking at the improvements, countries are also starting to assess the potential concerns with 5G networks specifically with Huawei’s 5G networks and infrastructure they are creating. The United States and their allies are starting to consider the potential security concerns that could occur with Huawei as the leader of the race for 5G technology. These concerns are related to: the Chinese intelligence law, infrastructure concerns, and the relative unknown nature of 5G networks and their security.

The first major concern has been related to the Chinese National Intelligence Law of 2016, in which the People’s Republic of China requires all Chinese companies and citizens “to support, aid, and cooperate in national intelligence work, and guard the secrecy of any national intelligence work that they are aware of. The law claims that the

¹²⁴ Economy, Elizabeth, et al. “How 2020 Shaped U.S.-China Relations.” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, www.cfr.org/article/how-2020-shaped-us-china-relations.

state shall protect individuals and organizations that support, cooperate with, and collaborate in national intelligence work.”¹²⁵ In the same way, the 2014 Counterintelligence Law states that organizations and individuals have an obligation to “provide information, facilities, or other assistance, and states the relevant organizations and individuals ‘must not refuse’ cooperation.” ¹²⁶ One author found that these two acts (2014 and 2016) leave little assurance regarding proper judicial or public oversight to constrain the introduction of backdoors, “should the state deem this necessary for its broad notion of maintaining state security.” ¹²⁷ Meaning, that the Chinese government could take steps to control or watch 5G networks if a Chinese manufacturer had control of the industry.

Researchers agree that the Chinese government could implement such backdoor’s as a means of espionage against the U.S. and its allies. “Australian and US spy agencies have assessed that under 5G, there can be no difference between the core and the edge, meaning the entire network is considered “critical infrastructure” and must be protected accordingly.” ¹²⁸ One analyst writes that the United States and Australia share similar concerns with Huawei, he has found that Britain’s Cyber Security Centre thinks different. However, within this organization, Huawei has established the Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation center, which is funded by Huawei and has members of Huawei on its board, to monitor risks posed by using Huawei equipment. The Huawei board found “that while

¹²⁵ Kaska, Kadri, et al. Huawei, 5G and China as a Security Threat, 28 Mar. 2019, www.ccdcoe.org/uploads/2019/03/CCDCOEHuawei-2019-03-28-FINAL.pdf.

¹²⁶ Kaska, Kadri, et al. Huawei, 5G and China as a Security Threat, 28 Mar. 2019, www.ccdcoe.org/uploads/2019/03/CCDCOEHuawei-2019-03-28-FINAL.pdf.

¹²⁷ Kaska, Kadri, et al. Huawei, 5G and China as a Security Threat, 28 Mar. 2019, www.ccdcoe.org/uploads/2019/03/CCDCOEHuawei-2019-03-28-FINAL.pdf.

¹²⁸ Bourke, Latika. “Why Are Huawei and 5G Such a Big Deal around the World?” The Sydney Morning Herald, The Sydney Morning Herald, 14 Feb. 2020, www.smh.com.au/world/europe/why-are-huawei-and-5g-such-a-big-deal-around-the-world20200131-p53wf0.html.

more computing will be pushed out of the centralized hubs or core, that computing can still be protected.” ¹²⁹ Meaning, that Britain does not think Huawei could comprise their core infrastructure and technology. This evaluation that Huawei cannot affect the core of Britain 5G networks can be called into question due to the source of this evaluation being Huawei, who is also the company in question for security risks.

The concerns regarding Huawei’s 5G networks extend into the IoT or “Internet of Things.” With 5G, most devices around the world are going to be connected with each other and the internet. While this will bring fast speeds and change the way the world communicates, research points that controlling the technology at the heart of 5G networks could give Huawei the capacity to spy on or disrupt communications if China needed them to.130 The researcher continues to say that the concern is that as more things become connected to the internet like fridges, cars, and fire alarms; state sponsored hackers could use these devices to infiltrate people’s networks in America or other American allies. One example of this is hackers could possible shut down the infrastructure of a city or municipality.¹³¹ Another analyst agrees with this research by saying, “the significance of fundamental infrastructure to the functioning of society makes the deployment of communications infrastructure a strategic decision not merely for the telecommunications operator, but for the nation, particularly as 5G is expected to lead to a massive growth of IoT-enabled services, ‘upgrading’ not merely the degree but

¹²⁹Bourke, Latika. “Why Are Huawei and 5G Such a Big Deal around the World?” The Sydney Morning Herald, The Sydney Morning Herald, 14 Feb. 2020, www.smh.com.au/world/europe/why-are-huawei-and-5g-such-a-big-deal-around-the-world20200131-p53wf0.html.

¹³⁰ Bowler, Tim. “Huawei: Why Is It Being Banned from the UK’s 5G Network?” BBC News, BBC, 14 July 2020, www.bbc.com/news/newsbeat-47041341.

¹³¹ Bowler, Tim. “Huawei: Why Is It Being Banned from the UK’s 5G Network?” BBC News, BBC, 14 July 2020, www.bbc.com/news/newsbeat-47041341.

the very character of contemporary societies’ digital dependency.” ¹³² He continues to say that a potential cyber incident could have major impacts on national security and national interest.

These infrastructure concerns stated above are pointed at Britain, currently, because of the infrastructure that Huawei has already built in the UK. Britain had to weigh the security concerns presented by its allies against the costs and time needed to take Huawei completely out of their 5G network implementation. The Culture Secretary Oliver Dowden said it would be delayed by two to three years and with added costs of up to £2bn.¹³³³ Given the cost and difficulty of replacing core infrastructure due to the architectural changes required and limited spectrum availability, supplier side risks must be weighed in a comprehensive manner and before making any decisions. ¹³⁴

Because of Huawei’s involvement with some of its closest allies, Washington has already started preparing for the security risks that could arise with 5G infrastructure that is created by Huawei. U.S. officials are worried that this infrastructure could be subverted for espionage, allowing Chinese intelligence agencies access to huge volumes of data. ¹³⁵ For years, the United States intel agencies have capitalized on the role of U.S. companies in global telecom networks to gather crucial intelligence. Because of the U.S. dominance in the intelligence sphere, the reason the United States is so worried about Huawei is because it could allow China to replace them as “the world’s premier intelligence power and perhaps even deny it access to the networks that make global commerce and the

¹³² Kaska, Kadri, et al. Huawei, 5G and China as a Security Threat, 28 Mar. 2019, www.ccdcoe.org/uploads/2019/03/CCDCOEHuawei-2019-03-28-FINAL.pdf.

¹³³³ Bowler, Tim. “Huawei: Why Is It Being Banned from the UK’s 5G Network?” BBC News, BBC, 14 July 2020, www.bbc.com/news/newsbeat-47041341.

¹³⁴ Kaska, Kadri, et al. *Huawei, 5G and China as a Security Threat, *28 Mar. 2019, www.ccdcoe.org/uploads/2019/03/CCDCOEHuawei-2019-03-28-FINAL.pdf.

¹³⁵ Johnson, Keith, and Elias Groll . “The Improbable Rise of Huawei.” Foreign Policy, 3 Apr. 2019, foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/03/the-improbable-rise-of-huawei-5g-global-network-china/.

projection of military power possible.” ¹³⁶ It is this need for intelligence dominance that is furthering the United States attempts to foil Chinese plans to implement the first fully functioning 5G networks.

While the U.S. has these security concerns, they also do not know the full extent of these concerns with the technology because the technology is so new and is still in the process of being implemented around the world. Graham Webster, a technology commentator says, “Part of the honest dilemma is people don’t know precisely what the risks will look like, but the Huawei question has jumped to the front of that discussion before the broader security assurance programs are really through.”¹³⁷ In 2019, Sue Gordon, the deputy director of national intelligence, reiterated this point by saying, “U.S. intelligence officials are already beginning to prepare for a world in which Huawei dominates next-generation telecommunications networks. We are going to have to figure out a way in a 5G world that we’re able to manage the risks in a diverse network that includes technology that we can’t trust. You have to presume a dirty network.”¹³⁸

These security concerns have presented the United States with different options of how to deal with the security threat of China has the world 5G leader, but there is no doubt that a security threat exists, says Dan Coats, the director of national intelligence. He warns, “foreign production of advanced communication networks “will challenge

¹³⁶ Johnson, Keith, and Elias Groll . “The Improbable Rise of Huawei.” Foreign Policy, 3 Apr. 2019, foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/03/the-improbable-rise-of-huawei-5g-global-network-china/.

¹³⁷ Feng, Emily, and Amy Cheng. “China’s Tech Giant Huawei Spans Much Of The Globe Despite U.S. Efforts To Ban It.” NPR, NPR, 24 Oct. 2019, www.npr.org/2019/10/24/759902041/chinas-tech-giant-huawei-spans-much-of-the-globe-despite-u-sefforts-to-ban-it.

¹³⁸ Johnson, Keith, and Elias Groll . “The Improbable Rise of Huawei.” Foreign Policy, 3 Apr. 2019, foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/03/the-improbable-rise-of-huawei-5g-global-network-china/.

U.S. competitiveness and data security,” and as American data increasingly flows across those networks, that will increase “the risk of foreign access and denial of service.”¹³⁹

III Sanctions against Huawei

It is because of these concerns that China will have the first 5G networks, that the United States has acted against Huawei as a means of protecting their national interest. Tim Ruhling, a 5G technology researcher says, “5G is turning more into a geopolitical battleground between the United States and China.”¹⁴⁰ Because of this political battleground, the United States has banned Huawei among other Chinese telecommunications companies from their cellular networks and infrastructure. In addition to the U.S., allies such as Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Taiwan, and other countries have banned Huawei and other Chinese companies like ZTE from their networks. However, “some nations have balked at U.S.-led efforts to keep Huawei and other Chinese firms out of the picture. Argentina, Brazil, Russia, the Philippines, and Thailand, all welcome China’s 5G tech.” ¹⁴¹

The United States is seeking a global ban of Huawei’s 5G equipment, however policy researchers do not believe this will happen. Many countries are resisting the pressure of the United States because of the price of Huawei and feeling that they can mitigate the risks of these networks.¹⁴² The reason the United States is pressing so strongly for a ban of Huawei networks is because of the intelligence sharing alliance called the Five Eyes

¹³⁹ Johnson, Keith, and Elias Groll . “The Improbable Rise of Huawei.” Foreign Policy, 3 Apr. 2019, foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/03/the-improbable-rise-of-huawei-5g-global-network-china/.

¹⁴⁰ Johnson, Keith, and Elias Groll . “The Improbable Rise of Huawei.” Foreign Policy, 3 Apr. 2019, foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/03/the-improbable-rise-of-huawei-5g-global-network-china/

¹⁴¹ Feng, Emily, and Amy Cheng. “China’s Tech Giant Huawei Spans Much Of The Globe Despite U.S. Efforts To Ban It.” NPR, NPR, 24 Oct. 2019, www.npr.org/2019/10/24/759902041/chinas-tech-giant-huawei-spans-much-of-the-globe-despite-u-sefforts-to-ban-it.

¹⁴² Feng, Emily, and Amy Cheng. “China’s Tech Giant Huawei Spans Much Of The Globe Despite U.S. Efforts To Ban It.” NPR, NPR, 24 Oct. 2019, www.npr.org/2019/10/24/759902041/chinas-tech-giant-huawei-spans-much-of-the-globe-despite-u-sefforts-to-ban-it.

that it is a member of. The U.S. says it will not send intelligence over networks that could be compromised or hijacked by Chinese intelligence agencies. “Washington believes that through 5G, Huawei could easily build in access points known as “back doors” that would allow it to take control of 5G networks to either hack them, take them down or take over mobile-connected devices to perform hostile actions. Such secret back doors could be installed into the equipment over time, allowing Beijing to penetrate networks.” ¹⁴³ Australia, who has also banned Huawei believes that this ban should not be for backdoors, but denial of service. Meaning that systems used in daily life could be taken offline.¹⁴⁴

While Huawei has not built infrastructure in most of the United States allied countries, the largest country who this ban affects is the United Kingdom. In January 2020, the U.K. agreed to allow Huawei to help build 35 percent of the country’s 5G infrastructure despite U.S. concerns that the company poses a risk to surveillance and intelligence theft.¹⁴⁵ However, after much pressure from the United States, the UK agreed to ban Huawei from its networks and infrastructure in July 2020. This move “banned the use of new Huawei 5G network equipment by the end of 2020 and remove existing Huawei network components by 2027.”¹⁴⁶ It will also ban UK mobile providers from buying new Huawei 5G equipment after the end of this year and they will have to remove

¹⁴³ Bourke, Latika. “Why Are Huawei and 5G Such a Big Deal around the World?” The Sydney Morning Herald, The Sydney Morning Herald, 14 Feb. 2020, www.smh.com.au/world/europe/why-are-huawei-and-5g-such-a-big-deal-around-theworld-20200131-p53wf0.html.

¹⁴⁴ Bourke, Latika. “Why Are Huawei and 5G Such a Big Deal around the World?” The Sydney Morning Herald, The Sydney Morning Herald, 14 Feb. 2020, www.smh.com.au/world/europe/why-are-huawei-and-5g-such-a-big-deal-around-the-world20200131-p53wf0.html.

¹⁴⁵ Conklin, Audrey. “When Will the US Have 5G Technology?” Fox Business, Fox Business, 4 Feb. 2020, www.foxbusiness.com/technology/us-5g-technology-mobile-arrival.

¹⁴⁶ Keane, Sean. “Huawei Ban Timeline: Chinese Company May Start Making Electric Vehicles This Year.” CNET, 2 Mar. 2021, www.cnet.com/news/huawei-ban-full-timeline-us-sanctions-china-5g-electric-vehicles/.

all of its 5G kit from their networks by 2027.¹⁴⁷ This was a step toward achieving the United States desire for 5G dominance because it is taking Huawei systems out of countries and discouraging its use.

Because of these bans, either being enforced or encouraged by the United States, countries are turning their eyes towards the United States for different 5G options that would be as advanced and relatively price similar to Huawei and their Chinese-based counterparts. The U.K is leading this charge as Tobias Ellwood, chair of the House of Commons Defense Select Committee, said the Five Eyes — an intelligence alliance between Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the U.K. and the U.S. — should develop its own Huawei rival. “What I think we need to recognize is that if we do allow Huawei in temporarily, we need to quickly create an alternative, which doesn’t exist at the moment. So, you look at Cisco, Ericsson, Nokia, you need to get these companies together with some international state funding to create our own 5G capability.”¹⁴⁸ Others share this sentiment, but not the same concern for viable options. “Huawei is at the center of a very complex issue in terms of cybersecurity, and the U.S. is trying to formulate a strategy that is like Huawei. But there are a bevy of very large, successful, strong alternatives to Huawei. I have no concerns about the availability of best-of-grade, leading-edge, 5G tech for America.”¹⁴⁹ With these alternatives, the U.S. and its allies are hoping to slow-down if not stop, Huawei’s ascent into the first company to fully implement 5G networks.

¹⁴⁷ Bowler, Tim. “Huawei: Why Is It Being Banned from the UK’s 5G Network?” BBC News, BBC, 14 July 2020, www.bbc.com/news/newsbeat-47041341.

¹⁴⁸ Kharpal, Arjun. “Huawei Says US Push to Create a 5G Rival ‘Would Be a Challenge’.” CNBC, CNBC, 21 Feb. 2020, www.cnbc.com/2020/02/21/huawei-says-us-push-to-create-a-5g-rival-would-be-a-challenge.html.

¹⁴⁹ Conklin, Audrey. “When Will the US Have 5G Technology?” Fox Business, Fox Business, 4 Feb. 2020, www.foxbusiness.com/technology/us-5g-technology-mobile-arrival.

Along with these options, some U.S. lawmakers have made suggestion on how the United States can gain traction in the race for 5G dominance. These include suggestions from Marco Rubio and former Attorney General William Barr. These suggestions call for the government to back an open source 5G architecture. The result, they claim, would allow new players to enter the networking equipment game for specific components rather than competing with Huawei in the entire architecture.”¹⁵⁰ Rubio, leading a group of bipartisan lawmakers, “introduced a bill earlier this year “providing over $1 billion to invest in Western-based alternatives to Chinese equipment providers Huawei and ZTE.”¹⁵¹

Another idea, suggested by former U.S. Attorney General William Barr, is for the government to do both. “Putting our large market and financial muscle behind one or both of these firms, would make it a far more formidable competitor and eliminate concerns over … their staying power,” Barr said.¹⁵² This option was quickly shut down by American lawmakers due to the United States being a capitalist society. Meanwhile, Larry Kudlow, the White House’s economic advisor, said in an interview with the Wall Street Journal that the “big-picture concept is to have all of the US 5G architecture and infrastructure done by American firms, principally.” He added that Ericsson and Nokia could also be a part of this movement.¹⁵³ While the United States has yet to present a viable option, Huawei is continuing to allocate is business elsewhere. “This year, it announced expanding research centers in Switzerland and $3.1 billion worth of

¹⁵⁰ Kharpal, Arjun. “Huawei Says US Push to Create a 5G Rival ‘Would Be a Challenge’.” CNBC, CNBC, 21 Feb. 2020, www.cnbc.com/2020/02/21/huawei-says-us-push-to-create-a-5g-rival-would-be-a-challenge.html.

¹⁵¹ Kharpal, Arjun. “Huawei Says US Push to Create a 5G Rival ‘Would Be a Challenge’.” CNBC, CNBC, 21 Feb. 2020, www.cnbc.com/2020/02/21/huawei-says-us-push-to-create-a-5g-rival-would-be-a-challenge.html.

¹⁵² Kharpal, Arjun. “Huawei Says US Push to Create a 5G Rival ‘Would Be a Challenge’.” CNBC, CNBC, 21 Feb. 2020, www.cnbc.com/2020/02/21/huawei-says-us-push-to-create-a-5g-rival-would-be-a-challenge.html.

¹⁵³ Kharpal, Arjun. “Huawei Says US Push to Create a 5G Rival ‘Would Be a Challenge’.” CNBC, CNBC, 21 Feb. 2020, www.cnbc.com/2020/02/21/huawei-says-us-push-to-create-a-5g-rival-would-be-a-challenge.html.

investment in Italy over the next three years. Italy promptly dropped proposed emergency legislation to ban Huawei from its 5G networks two days later.”¹⁵⁴ Feng believes that while the United States and its allies ban Huawei and do not produce a viable alternative, it will not stop Huawei from pursuing business and investment in every other country around the world.

This belief by Feng is one that is often being overlooked by U.S. policymakers, but one that I believe one of the most important beliefs that people need to focus on when looking at 5G networks and the U.S.- China race for dominance with these networks and the world. The United States can ban Huawei networks to slow down China in the race for 5G, but it does not mean that the United States will start to gain ground on China any faster, especially in a race that is more of a marathon than a sprint.

¹⁵⁴ Feng, Emily, and Amy Cheng. “China’s Tech Giant Huawei Spans Much Of The Globe Despite U.S. Efforts To Ban It.” NPR, NPR, 24 Oct. 2019, www.npr.org/2019/10/24/759902041/chinas-tech-giant-huawei-spans-much-of-the-globe-despite-u-sefforts-to-ban-it.